The
Short History
of the Starship
(and
insights into
design of the air craft)
Information
provided
by Beech/Raytheon
In
the late 70s, the Beech Aircraft Company was on top of the small
business
aircraft market. The company's King Air twin had achieved about a 50
per cent
market share. The remainder of the business turboprop market was
divided among
Cessna, Piper, Mitsubishi, Swearingen and Rockwell.
Unfortunately,
the company's best-selling King Air design was about 15 years old.
With
such a large market share, Beech executives reasoned that they could
only lose
market share in the future unless they took a dramatic leap forward. So
in
1979, Beech decided to begin work on a new pressurized, all-composite
twin-engine business turboprop, a brand new generation of aircraft
based on
latest building materials technology and a bold new, innovative design.
Thus
began the most ambitious new development project in the history of
general
aviation, what would become the Beechcraft Starship.
The
leading design had its engines mounted in the rear to reduce cabin
noise. It
had an aft-positioned main wing on which to mount the engines and
balance
lifting forces. A conventional rudder would have made a huge sounding
board for
the propellers, so instead, control of the yaw axis and vertical
stabilizer
function was assigned to tip-sails on each wingtip.
The
King Air's large cabin had always been a major selling point, and the
new Beech
design had an even larger one, approaching the size of a medium jet's.
Increased size brought increased weight, and the decision was made
early on to
build it using innovative new composites for its favorable
strength-to-weight
ratio.
The
world's acknowledged expert in tandem wing, all-composite pusher
aircraft at
that time was Burt Rutan. In 1982, Beech approached Rutan and his
company, Scaled
Composites in Mojave, California, to participate in the final
configuration
study.
The
result was the design for Starship, with its variable sweep forward
wing, all
composite construction and rear-mounted Pratt & Whitney turboprops.
While
Beech began preliminary design of the full-size prototypes, Scaled
Composites
was engaged to build an 85 per cent scale proof of-concept prototype to
flight-test the configuration.
The
proof of concept was completed in record time, and made its first
flight in
late August of 1983. A little over a month later, the new aircraft,
then dubbed
the Starship, was introduced at the National Business Aircraft
Association
Convention in Dallas, Texas.
When
the proof of concept Starship made its first appearance, it seemed to
many
people like a very real aircraft. It was as large as a 90-series King
Air,
looked good in the air and clearly performed well. To the uneducated
observer,
it appeared one could put an interior in it, tweak the design here and
there
and begin a certification program. Sadly, this wasn't the case. The
proof of
concept had no certifiable systems and no pressurization. It was not
even built
out of the intended materials. It was essentially a large flying wind
tunnel
model designed for a program of 100 test flight hours or less, although
it flew
five times that long.
The
proof of concept Starship's appearance at the Dallas convention gave
the
impression Beech was much further along than it was, and gave credence
to an
optimistic schedule the company had announced for certification: the
end of
1985. However, by early 1984, many subcontractors still had not come
close to
delivering their components on time, and there was concern some might
not be
able to deliver at all. If there was to be a Starship, Beech realized
it would
have to develop it by itself. This resulted in substantial delays while
Beech
gained experience with the properties and manufacturing techniques
required of
resins, fibers, adhesives, composite honeycombs and sealants unique to
composite aircraft.
In
a more conventional program, production would have taken a back seat to
development and certification, but the nature of composite construction
--
making parts in molds—dictated that Beech build the Starship prototypes
with
production tooling, which gave production an equal priority. To
accommodate
production, the company added a quarter-of-a-million square feet of
manufacturing space.
Further
delays came from unexpected complications: correcting a pitch damping
problem
and developing a stall warning system, at the FAA's insistence, for an
aircraft
inherently designed not to stall.
The
FAA was watching the Starship's development closely and was
particularly
demanding, as the Starship was to be the first FAA-certified composite
aircraft. For instance, the FAA required the generation of
substantially more
aerodynamic loading data than would have been usual for a conventional
design,
in order to prove that classical loads analysis could conservatively
apply to
the radical new tandem composite wing design. The FAA did not have
established
design-life criteria for composite structures, and designed a rigorous
test
program involving the cycling of the test structure through damage
expected
over two anticipated airframe lifetimes (40,000 hours), subjecting it
to damage
repeatedly and measuring its ability to carry load.
One
of the greatest challenges to building and certifying the all-composite
airframe was lightning protection. It was found that unprotected
composite
material could be blown apart by a lightning strike. Substantial study
and
testing was done; for instance, a fuselage section was subjected to
200,000-amp
simulated lightning strikes in Raytheon's test facility. The solution
was a
mesh of fine wires under the first layer of the composite skin, and a
ground-plane system to shield the electronics. Lightning current was
allowed to
flow through and out, leaving only minor surface and cosmetic damage at
the
strike point.
More
than any other general aviation aircraft of its time, the Starship was
a child
of the computer age; its design, development, manufacturing, operation
and
maintenance all relied heavily on computer input. A major portion of
the work
was done on a system called CATIA, which provided a three-dimensional
design environment
and interfaced with tooling.
The
first full-size Starship made its maiden flight on February 15th, 1986.
The
second joined the test flight program in June 1986, and the third was
ready for
flight in the early spring of 1987. In the course of a two-year flight
test
program, they flew almost 2,000 hours, and on June 14th the Starship
received
FAA certification. The first production Starship, NC-4, went on flight
test
late 1988.
The
five-and-a-half-year development program cost more than $300 million
and
millions of man hours. For its investment, which included mastering a
new
technology, building a new manufacturing facility and training a
workforce,
Beechcraft/Raytheon only built 53 Starships. Production was halted due
to poor
commercial demand. Of the 53 built, only a small handful were ever
actually
sold.
This
text incorporates material from a number of
sources, but draws heavily from a longer more technical history of the
Starship
by Max E. Bleck, former president and CEO of Beech Aircraft
Corporation. Max's
original text can be viewed as a PDF from here.
Another
fine historical account of the Starship's creation by John W. Kensinger
can be found
on the Internet.
The Beechcraft
Starship is a
futuristic-looking United States turboprop-powered six- to
eight-passenger seat
business aircraft. The design was originated by Beechcraft
in January 1980 as Preliminary Design 330 (PD 330). Burt Rutan was
subsequently
retained to refine PD330 and one of the significant changes he
instituted was
the addition of variable geometry to the canard (he holds a patent for
this).
Rutan's California-based design and fabrication company Scaled
Composites was
then contracted to build scale-model prototypes to aid in development.
Development
Work
began in 1979 when Beechcraft
identified a need to replace the King Air 200 model. After a brief
hiatus while
the company was being bought by Raytheon, full development began in
1982 when
Beechcraft approached Burt Rutan of Scaled Composites, a leader in the
field of
novel composite aircraft design. Much of the design work utilized
computer-aided
design, using the CATIA system.
While in
development at Scaled
Composites, the 85%-scale prototype was the Model 115, and
Beechcraft
referred to the production version as the Model 2000. The Model
115
first flew in late August 1983. However, this aircraft had no
pressurization
system, no certified avionics, and a different airframe design and
material
specifications than the planned production Model 2000. Only one Model
115 was
built, and it has since been scrapped.
The
first full-size Starship (the Model
2000) flew on February 15, 1986.
Prototypes were produced even as development work was
continuing — a system demanded by the use of composite materials, as
the
tooling required is very expensive and has to be built for production
use from
the outset. The program was delayed several times, at first due to
underestimating the development complexity involved and later to
overcome
technical difficulties concerning the stall-warning system.
The
first production Starship flew in
late 1988, after over $300 million in development costs. Those working
in the
program have stated that much of the development delay was due to the
new
owners' ongoing vacillation and lack of assurance over whether to
continue with
the new-concept project.
The
Starship was notable for several
reasons:
Beechcraft
Starship
Commercially,
the aircraft was a
failure, with little demand. Only fifty-three Starships were ever
built, and of
those only a handful were sold. Many of the aircraft were eventually
leased by
Raytheon, which allowed the company to control their distribution and
operational life. Raytheon considered the cost of supporting a
commercial fleet
of just 53 aircraft with necessary parts and flight training to be
prohibitive.
Leasing the aircraft allowed Raytheon to effectively recall and ground
most of
the fleet at the end of their initial leases.
Some
reasons for the lack of demand:
End of
the program
In 2003,
Beechcraft deemed that the
aircraft was no longer popular enough to justify its support costs, and
has
recalled all leased aircraft for scrapping. The company was also said
to be
buying back privately-owned Starships, though some Starship owners say
they
have never been contacted by Raytheon about this. Raytheon's spin-off, Hawker
Beech Corporation, continues to offer technical support by phone
but no
longer offers parts support to current Starship operators. Rockwell
Collins has maintained full
support for the AMS-850 avionics suite. In March 2008, the third of the
five
remaining Starships completed RVSM
certification returning the aircraft's service ceiling to the original FL410 limit.
Almost
all of the recalled Starships
have been ground up and incinerated at the "boneyard" at the Evergreen
Air Center located at the Pinal Airpark in Arizona. The planes have little
aluminum
for recycling. A few have been
purchased by
individuals who regard them as lovable failures, much like the infamous
Ford Edsel.
Starship Model 2000A NC-51 was used as a chase plane during the re-entry
phase of
Burt Rutan's SpaceShipOne.
Several Starships have been donated to museums since the
decommissioning
program began, with the Kansas
Aviation
Museum receiving the first aircraft in August 2003. Starship
NC-42,
flown by the architect David Schwarz for many years, is now at the Museum of
Flight in Everett, Washington.Starship N214JB is displayed at the Southern
Museum of Flight adjacent to the Birmingham
International Airport in Alabama. Starship NC-27, N74TD,
is on
static display at the Evergreen
Aviation & Space Museumin McMinnville, Orgeon.
As of
autumn 2008 only six Starships
continue to hold airworthiness registration with the FAA. Three
Starships are
based in Oklahoma, one in Washington, one in California, and one is
still
registered to Raytheon Aircraft Credit Corporation in Wichita, Kansa
A
Beechcraft Starship chasing
a Scaled
Composites SpaceShipOne
during a test flight
Data
from
Beechcraft Starship 2000A Performance, Specifications & Equipment[3]
General
characteristics
Performance
· What's
it like to fly a Starship?
· You
might look at a canard aircraft like the Starship and ask yourself if
it flies
like a conventional airplane. With the exceptions outlined above
regarding the superior ride in turbulence, the Starship flies like any
other
airplane in the sense that the control inputs are the same. But
flying a
Starship is a wonderful experience. The voluminous flight deck is
beautifully laid out for single pilot operations. The sound and
feel of
the engines and airframe are at once powerful and poetic. The
composite
structure and the twin 1,200 hp Pratts sing a duet of strength and
security;
A Starship pilot feels as safe as babe in his/her mother's arms.
The
machine feels like the melding of a magic carpet and a Mercedes
Benz.
She's strong, smooth and majestic.
· It's
also kind of fun checking in as a Starship with ATC, controllers always
respond
with enthusiasm. One can't help daydream about returning to earth
in a
real Starship, generations in the future.
· On
the ramp she gathers more stares than a girl in a bikini. To me,
nothing
could be better than flying a Starship. When I'm very old, I'll
dream
about it every night.
·
Why
didn't the
Starship sell well?
1)
Revolutionary design.
The
aviation
community accepts new concepts slowly and evolution is generally
preferred over
revolution. While many potential buyers were awestruck by the
Starship's
beauty, most chose to sit on the fence for a few years to see if the
Starship
proved to be a viable design. The Starship was radically
different from
conventional aircraft when introduced in the mid 1980's and heralded
four revolutionary
technologies:
a)
First
certificated all glass cockpit and FMS
b)
First
certificated all composite business class aircraft (still the only
certificated
composite wing)
c)
First
certificated tandem wing (canard) aircraft.
d)
First
certificated pusher
We all
now know that
the glass cockpit is superior to steam gauges and that composites are
superior
to metal for airframe construction. The canard vs. conventional
configuration is still a topic of heated debate, however. All I
can say
is, why in the world would you want to have a tail mounted stabilizer
that
pushes DOWN when the basic purpose of an aircraft is to lift you into
the
air? But most aerodynamicists I've spoken with argue that the
canard's
forward wing is so heavily loaded that the resulting drag leads to no
gain in
efficiency over a tail in back design. It also seems to be true
that
pusher props are no more efficient than a tractor. That's because
the
airflow to the props is disturbed by the fuselage and wing ahead of
them.
But a pusher definitely creates a much quieter cabin and far less
vibration
than a tractor. The Starship is extremely quiet inside and cabin
noise
levels seem more like a jet than a turboprop. Normal
conversations can be
had without raising your voice and virtually no vibration can be felt
inside
the airplane. A pusher design also allows the propellers to be
mounted
very close together because they don't have a fuselage between
them. The
Starships props are only 8 inches apart, yielding nearly centerline
thrust from
each engine. During an engine out situation in the Starship, yaw
is
virtually unnoticeable and is completely countered by the yaw damper,
if
engaged; No need to step on the good engine. Also, from
personal
experience, I can safely argue that the canard design yields a superior
ride. Wings mounted at each end of the fuselage, combined with
the heavy
wing loading of the canard ends up dampening the bumps in bad air.
2)
Raytheon
This
section is based
on my experience as the owner / pilot of Starship NC-51 and with
conversations
I have had with other Starship owners, Raytheon employees, RAS
employees and
other aviation professionals who know the Starship program
intimately. I
am interested in sharing what I have experienced and heard. It is
not my
intention to criticize Raytheon, RAS or their management.
a)
Timing
Raytheon
had lousy
timing when it came to the Starship. The aircraft was introduced
to an
anemic market in 1989 during the height of an economic recession.
You
couldn't give away an executive aircraft during this period, let alone
successfully promote an all new design. So Starship sales got off
to a
very disappointing start.
But by
1995 the
economy had become robust and corporate expenditures for new aircraft
were in a
cyclical upturn. Just as important, the Starship's all glass
cockpit and
composite structure had become accepted as superior art by the aviation
community. This is precisely the period when Raytheon could have
made a
success of the Starship. In 1995 Raytheon should have "put the
pedal
to the metal" to promote the Starship's superb safety record and
exceptional ride. But instead, Raytheon opted to pull the plug on
Starship production. Bad timing, again.
b)
Price
Unfortunately,
Raytheon priced the Starship at almost $5,000,000. This was
way
more expensive than the King Air that the Starship was intended to
replace and
was virtually the same price as an introductory jet at that time.
3.5 to
4 million dollars would have been a more realistic price point for the
Starship.
c)
Free
Maintenance
To help
boost
Starship sales, Raytheon management had the brilliant idea of offering
free
maintenance to buyers. In the end, this program probably had more
to do
with Raytheon's decision to discontinue the Starship than anything else
and helped
falsely earn the Starship a reputation of being a maintenance hog.
Raytheon
Aircraft
Services (RAS) was responsible for doing the "free" maintenance for
Starship owners. To understand what happened, it's important to
point out
that RAS is a separate company from Raytheon.
As with
any service
business, aircraft maintenance has its slack periods. But when
RAS
facilities had slack periods in the early 90's, many of them found
Starships on
the ramp to work on. They would work on the Starships whether
they needed
it or not and many of these airplanes were still owned and operated by
Raytheon.
Even if
the Starship
was owned by a private party, owners didn't care how big the invoice
was
because Raytheon was paying the tab. With nobody questioning the
invoices, one can imagine the scale of the billings that took place.
Periodically,
Raytheon would ask RAS to explain why the Starship fleet was so
expensive to
maintain. And naturally, RAS would respond that the Starship was
a very
complex airplane that was difficult to work on. Raytheon accepted
these
claims and continued paying the maintenance bills. But in
reality, the
free maintenance program was a billing machine for RAS and nobody at
Raytheon
had the incentive to figure it out and end it..
So free
maintenance
resulted in record billings to Raytheon, souring management's view of
the
Starship and frightening prospective customers. Raytheon
management
bought the RAS line that the Starship was complex and difficult to work
on,
eventually putting the red ink to bed by killing Starship production.
As an
aside, my
Starship is not maintained by RAS. NC-51's maintenance costs have
been
lower than I originally budgeted for a King Air B-200. In the 8+
years I
have owned NC-51, I have been able to depart on 784 out of over 785
flights (a
99.9% dispatch rate). I'll put that record against any airplane
in
existence.
3)
The FAA
Before
the Starship
came along, the FAA had never certificated a composite airframe, so
they were
naturally very cautious when approached with the Starship design.
In an
effort to err on the safe side, the FAA essentially told Beech that
although
their design looked good on paper, the design would have to be
significantly
strengthened to receive certification.
Beechcraft
did so,
adding significant additional structure to both the fuselage and
wing. Of
course, this added quite a bit of weight to the aircraft, so other
components
had to be beefed up as well, adding yet more weight.
In the
end, the
Starship's max ramp weight rose by over 2,500 lbs to 15,010 lbs.
All of
these trips back to the drawing board had another detrimental
effect;
Certification, production and customer delivery of the first airframes
kept
slipping, slipping, slipping, into the future.
The
original design
was to be less than the FAA's 12,500 lb. limit for non type rated
operation. But the redesigned Starship ended up requiring a type
rating
to fly, and many owner operators were intimidated by the prospect of
going
through the type rating process. Those pilots chose other
aircraft such
as Beech's venerable King Air instead, which could be flown with a
simple twin
engine rating.
The
higher weight of
the Starship also reduced Beech's projected performance claims for the
Starship. The Starship was supposed to have a max cruise speed of
352
knots, a useful load of 4,599 lbs, stall at 79 knots and fly for
over
2,500 nm at max range power. But after the FAA was done beefing
up the
airframe, those numbers became 338 knots, 4,710 lbs, 89 knots and 1,575
nm
respectively. But even with the extra weight and reduced
performance, the
Starship still outperformed the King Air B-200. This is an
amazing thing,
and speaks volumes for the strength of the Starship's original
design.
How many
other
aircraft designs could even fly after such a weight gain, let
alone
climb to 41,000 feet? All this while actually increasing the
useful load
by 111 lbs. The Starship is a truly great aircraft, even with her
extra
heft. Imagine how fabulous the Starship would have been if the
FAA had
certificated her original design.
How many
Starships were built?
53 - 3
experimental
airframes followed by 50 production airframes. The production
airframes
were built at Beechcraft's Wichita, Kansas factory between 1989 and
1995.
The first half of production (NC-04 - NC-28) were designated "Starship
1,
model 2000" while the second half of production (NC-29 - NC-53) were
designated "Starship 2000A". The 2000A's had a modified
interior; 8 total seats (2 crew, 6 passenger) with a private
bathroom in
the rear of the cabin. The original Starship 1 had 10 total seats
(2
crew, 8 passenger) with a less private potty where the forward closet
is
located in the 2000A. The 2000A also had increased performance
figures
over the Starship 1. Many of the Starship 1's were modified to
2000A
status with Beechcraft kit P/N 122-9002.
What are
the advantages of the Starship
design?
1)
Safety
a)
Stall
resistant main wing.
Like all
good canard
designs, the Starship's forward wing (canard) is more heavily loaded
that the
main wing. In fact, the Starship's forward wing has almost twice
the
loading of the main wing; 72.68 lbs/sq ft vs. 37.13 lbs/sq ft
respectively. The result is that the forward wing stalls first
while the
main wing continues to provide lift and aileron control. When the
Starship's forward wing stalls, it is a relatively benign event.
At stall
angle of attack, the forward wing gently lowers itself to an angle of
attack
that gets it flying again. Under many conditions it does not even
drop
appreciably, but simply refuses to raise the nose to a higher angle of
attack. Under other conditions, you can get the Starship into a
pitch
buck routine. Imagine holding full aft elevator through forward
wing stall
and beyond. The forward wing will stall, then it lowers itself to
a
flying angle of attack, then it gains lift raising the nose again, then
the
forward wing stalls and the cycle repeats. It's a bit like riding
a very
gentle roller coaster. In a pitch buck at a low power setting the
Starship will exhibit this roller coaster routine while descending at
an
average of about 1,000 ft per minute. Add power while holding the
yoke in
your lap and the Starship will continue the pitch buck while climbing
at
1,000 ft per minute! The point of all this is that the Starship
is very
safe when it comes to stall/spin accident potential.
b)
Reduced yaw
during engine out.
The
Starship's aft
mounted pusher props are about 8 inches apart, providing almost
centerline
thrust from each engine. In the event of an engine failure there is
almost
imperceptible yaw moment. No rudder input is required by the
pilot if the
yaw damper is engaged at the time of engine failure. Also, the
Starship's
autofeather feature will automatically and instantaneously feather the
dead
engine. No need to step on the good engine and feather the
correct
prop; Just go to max power and fly the airplane normally.
Nice.
c)
A super
strong fuselage.
During
testing,
Beechcraft dropped a Starship at 17 feet per second and the fuselage
incurred
no damage. The test dummies in the Starship's seats sustained
lumbar
loads of only 1,000 lbs. Crippling spinal injuries are likely to
occur at
1,500 lbs. Imagine dropping a metal fuselage at the same
speed.
d)
Single pilot
friendly
The
Starship is
wonderfully easy to fly and stay mentally ahead of . The
integrated
avionics and Flight Management System (FMS) reduce pilot work load and
provide
enhanced situational awareness allowing him./her to concentrate on
flying the
airplane at all times. The flight computers handle all of the
mundane
chores that used to require an E6B. Detailed fuel data, Vnav
advisory
info, 10 second advance airspeed prediction and a litany of other
information
is always available at a glance or the press of a button. When a
busy
controller rifles off a new course, altitude, frequency and airspeed,
the
Starship pilot just enters the numbers into the appropriate instruments
and
reads them back directly from the panel; No need for a pen.
e)
No metal
fatigue
Metal
becomes less
strong (fatigues) over repeated stress cycles. A metal airplane
effectively loses a little bit of it's original strength every time it
flies. A very old metal airplane with a lot of flight cycles, if
stressed
to it's original design limitations, might break up in flight.
But
composites don't fatigue. So after 25 years of flying, the
Starship
should be just as strong as the day it rolled off the assembly
line.
f)
No
structural corrosion
Metal
airplanes
corrode, especially if they are based near the ocean. Such
corrosion can
eat into an aircraft's structure, weakening the airframe over
time. The
Starship's composite structure does not corrode. So it's possible
that a
Starship could fly for a thousand years while based at the Bonneville
salt
flats.
2)
Super smooth
ride
As
mentioned above,
the Starship handles like a big Mercedes sedan and has an unbelievably
smooth
ride. The Starship's great ride is particularly evident in
turbulence.
The stiff metal wings on other aircraft transmit turbulence loads to
the
fuselage with little dampening. But the Starship's composite main
wings
flex noticeably in bad air, absorbing energy and smoothing out the
ride.
The tandem wing configuration also helps iron out the bumps.
Sometimes
the Starship seems to gently rock along it's lateral axis as it makes
it's way
through turbulence; A bit like a ship on the
ocean.
3)
Quiet cabin
The
Starship's pusher
props, composite fuselage and interior sound absorption system create a
cabin
that is unusually quiet for a turboprop aircraft; Noise levels
inside are
closer to a jet and cabin conversations can be had at normal voice
levels. In the cockpit, most of the ambient noise emanates from
the
avionics cooling fans, environmental fans and outside
airflow. It's
so quiet up front that you can actually hear the hobbs meter clicking
off
tenths of an hour.
4)
Efficiency,
speed & altitude
Even
with all the
design modifications foisted upon Beech's original design, the Starship
still
outperforms the King Air 350. The Starship is 26 kts faster (338
vs. 312)
and flies 6,000 feet higher (41,000 vs. 35,000). And get this,
the
Starship's cabin is 12" wider and 6.5" higher than the King Air 350!
What's
it like to fly
a Starship?
You
might look at a
canard aircraft like the Starship and ask yourself if it flies like a
conventional airplane. With the exceptions outlined above
regarding the
superior ride in turbulence, the Starship flies like any other airplane
in the
sense that the control inputs are the same. But flying a Starship
is a
wonderful experience. The voluminous flight deck is beautifully
laid out
for single pilot operations. The sound and feel of the engines
and
airframe are at once powerful and poetic. The composite structure
and the
twin 1,200 hp Pratts sing a duet of strength and security; A
Starship
pilot feels as safe as babe in his/her mother's arms. The machine
feels
like the melding of a magic carpet and a Mercedes Benz. She's
strong,
smooth and majestic.
It's
also kind of fun
checking in as a Starship with ATC, controllers always respond with
enthusiasm. One can't help daydream about returning to earth in a
real
Starship, generations in the future.
On the
ramp she
gathers more stares than a girl in a bikini. To me, nothing could
be
better than flying a Starship. When I'm very old, I'll dream
about it
every night.
Why is
Raytheon scrapping it's fleet of
Starships?
Raytheon's
response:
"In
regards to your
Starship query, we are indeed decommissioning the fleet. We made
the
business decision that because of the low number of aircraft in
service, and
the specialized parts necessary to keep the aircraft flying, that it
did not
make sense from a business standpoint to continue to support the
aircraft."
What
would Walter
Beech think?
Design
refinements for a future
Starship II:
1. Re
certify the
Starship according to Beechcraft's original structural design;
Filament
wind the fuselage; Shed 2,500 lbs and fly faster, further.
2. Replace
the props
with turbo fan engines, thereby eliminating fuselage/wing wake issues.
3. Remove
all but the
inside 2 vortex generators on the forward wing. Starship
aerodynamicist
John Roncz claims that only the 2 inboard VG's are necessary to keep
airflow
attached to the trim tabs; The rest are completely
unnecessary.
According to Mr. Roncz, the Starship would gain 10 to 15 knots with
this simple
design change.
4. Eliminate
the 800 lb.
flap system. Deploying the flaps reduces the Starship's stall
speed by
only 5 knots. Without the extra weight of the flap system the
difference might
be only 3 knots.
The
Beechcraft Starship is a futuristic-looking aircraft designed by Burt
Rutan's
Scaled Composites, and produced by the Beech Aircraft Corporation. It
is a six-
to eight-seat business transport.
Development cost $300 million, and began in 1979 when Beechcraft
identified a
need to replace the King Air model. After a brief hiatus while the
company was
bought by Raytheon, full development began in 1982 when Beechcraft
approached
Burt Rutan of Scaled Composites, a leader in the field of novel
composite
aircraft design. Much of the design work utilised computer-aided
design, using
the CATIA system.
While
in development at Scaled, the 85%-scale prototype was the Model 115,
and
Beechcraft referred to the production version as the Model 2000. The
Model 115
first flew in late August 1983. However, this aircraft had no
pressurization
system, no certified avionics, and had a different airframe design and
material
specifications than the planned production Model 2000. This aircraft
has since
been scrapped.
The
first full-size Starship flew on February 15, 1986. Prototypes were
produced
even as development work was continuing -- a system demanded by the use
of composite
materials, as the tooling required is very expensive and has to be
built for
production use from the outset. The program was delayed several times,
at first
due to underestimating the development complexity involved and later to
overcome technical difficulties concerning the stall-warning system.
The
first production Starship flew in late 1988.
The
Starship was notable for several reasons. First was its all-graphite
composite
airframe, using high-tech materials instead of aluminium. These
materials were
in frequent use to varying degrees on military aircraft, but no
civilian
aircraft certified by the FAA had ever used them so extensively.
Composites
were chosen in order to reduce the weight of the airplane which,
unfortunately,
still came in over its target weight.
Second
was its canard design, with the lifting surface aft of the horizontal
stabilizer. The aircraft lacks a rudder, with yaw control instead
provided by
small fins on the wingtips.
Third
was its use of a pusher design, in which the turboprop engines were
mounted
facing the rear and pushed, rather than pulled, the aircraft forward.
The
pusher design offers a quieter ride, since the gusts of wind and air
off the
tips of the propellers no longer strike the side of the aircraft, as
they do on
conventionally configured turboprops.
The
aircraft also features a 16-tube "glass cockpit" supplied by Rockwell
Collins Avionics.
Commercially
the aeroplane was a failure, with little demand. Only 53 Starships were
ever
built, and of those only a handful were sold. Many of the remainder
were
eventually leased.
Reasons for the lack of demand probably included price, performance,
and
economic conditions. The list price in 1989 was $3.9 million, similar
to the
Cessna Citation V and Lear 31 jets, which were 89 and 124 knots faster
than the
Starship at maximum cruise, respectively. The Piper Cheyenne turboprop
was
faster and sold for $1 million less. (Aviation Week, Oct. 2, 1989).
In 2003, Beechcraft deemed that the aircraft was no longer popular
enough to justify
its support costs, and has recalled all leased aircraft for scrapping.
The
company is also said to be aggressively trying to buy back
privately-owned
Starships, though some Starship owners say they have never been
contacted by
Raytheon about this.
Most
of the Starships are being ground up and burned at the "boneyard" at
the Evergreen Air Centre. The planes have little aluminium for
recycling. A few
have been bought up by private owners who regard them as lovable
failures, much
like the infamous Ford Edsel.
Recently,
Starship Model 2000A NC-51 was used as a chase plane during the
re-entry phase
of Burt Rutan's SpaceShipOne. Several Starships have been donated to
museums
since the official decommissioning program began, with the Kansas
Aviation
Museum receiving the first aircraft in August of 2003.
Why
the Starship sell well
1)
Revolutionary design.
The
aviation community accepts new concepts slowly and evolution is
generally
preferred over revolution. While many potential buyers were awestruck
by the
Starship's beauty, most chose to sit on the fence for a few years to
see if the
Starship proved to be a viable design. The Starship was radically
different
from conventional aircraft when introduced in the mid 1980's and
heralded four
revolutionary technologies:
a) First
certificated all glass cockpit and FMS
b) First
certificated all composite business class
aircraft (still the only certificated composite wing)
c) First
certificated tandem wing (canard) aircraft.
d) First
certificated pusher
We
all now know that the glass cockpit is superior to steam gauges and
that
composites are superior to metal for airframe construction. The canard
vs.
conventional configuration is still a topic of heated debate, however.
All I
can say is, why in the world would you want to have a stabilizer that
pushes
DOWN when the basic purpose of an aircraft is to lift you into the air?
I know,
it's stability, stupid. But you get the same stability with a canard
design
while gaining about 5% in efficiency. It's also debatable that the
pusher
configuration is any better than a tractor design and it's generally
accepted
that a pusher is no more efficient than a tractor. That's because the
airflow
to the props is disturbed by the fuselage and wing ahead of them. But a
pusher
definitely creates a much quieter cabin than a tractor. The Starship is
extremely quiet inside and the cabin noise levels seem more like a jet
than a
turboprop. Normal conversations can be had without raising your voice.
A pusher
design also allows the propellers to be mounted very close together
because
they don't have a fuselage between them. The Starships props are only
inches
apart, yielding nearly centreline thrust from each engine. During an
engine out
situation in the Starship, yaw is virtually unnoticeable and is
completely
countered by the yaw damper, if engaged; No need to step on the dead
engine.
2) Raytheon
This
section is based on my experience as the owner / pilot of Starship
NC-51 and
with conversations I have had with other Starship owners, Raytheon
employees,
RAS employees and other aviation professionals who know the Starship
program
intimately. I am interested in sharing what I have experienced and
heard. It is
not my intention to criticize Raytheon, RAS or their management.
a) Timing
Raytheon
had lousy timing when it came to the Starship. The aircraft was
introduced to
an anaemic market in 1989 during the height of an economic recession.
You
couldn't give away an executive aircraft during this period, let alone
successfully promote an all new design. So Starship sales got off to a
very
disappointing start.
But
by 1995 the economy had become robust and corporate expenditures for
new
aircraft were in a cyclical upturn. Just as important, the Starship's
all glass
cockpit and composite structure had become accepted as superior art by
the
aviation community. This is precisely the period when Raytheon could
have made
a success of the Starship. In 1995 Raytheon should have "put the pedal
to
the metal" to promote the Starship's superb safety record and
exceptional
ride. But instead, Raytheon opted to pull the plug on Starship
production. Bad
timing, again.
b) Price
Unfortunately,
Raytheon priced the Starship at almost $5,000,000. This was way more
expensive
than the King Air that the Starship was intended to replace and was
virtually
the same price as an introductory jet at that time. 3.5 to 4 million
dollars
would have been a more realistic price point for the Starship.
c) Free Maintenance
To
help boost Starship sales, Raytheon management had the brilliant idea
of
offering free maintenance to buyers. In the end, this program probably
had more
to do with Raytheon's decision to discontinue the Starship than
anything else
and helped falsely earn the Starship a reputation of being a
maintenance hog.
Raytheon Aircraft Services (RAS) was responsible for doing the "free"
maintenance for Starship owners. To understand what happened, it's
important to
point out that RAS is a separate company from Raytheon
As
with any service business, aircraft maintenance has its slack periods.
But when
RAS facilities had slack periods in the early 90's, many of them found
Starships on the ramp to work on. They would work on the Starships
whether they
needed it or not and many of these airplanes were still owned and
operated by
Raytheon.
Even if the Starship was owned by a private party, owners didn't care
how big
the invoice was because Raytheon was paying the tab. With nobody
questioning
the invoices, one can imagine the scale of the billings that took place.
Periodically,
Raytheon would ask RAS to explain why the Starship fleet was so
expensive to
maintain. And naturally, RAS would respond that the Starship was a very
complex
airplane that was difficult to work on. Raytheon accepted these claims
and continued
paying the maintenance bills. But in reality, the free maintenance
program was
a billing machine for RAS and nobody at Raytheon had the incentive to
figure it
out and end it..
So free maintenance resulted in record billings to Raytheon, souring
management's
view of the Starship and frightening prospective customers. Raytheon
management
bought the RAS line that the Starship was complex and difficult to work
on,
eventually putting the red ink to bed by killing Starship production.
As an aside, my Starship is not maintained by RAS. NC-51's maintenance
costs
have been lower than I originally budgeted for a King Air B-200. In the
7+
years I have owned NC-51, I have been able to depart on 698 out of over
700
flights (a 99.7% dispatch rate). I'll put that record against any
airplane in
existence.
3) The FAA
Before
the Starship came along, the FAA had never certificated a composite
airframe,
so they were naturally very cautious when approached with the Starship
design.
In an effort to err on the safe side, the FAA essentially told Beech
that
although their design looked good on paper, the design would have to be
significantly strengthened to receive certification
Beechcraft
did so, adding significant additional structure to both the fuselage
and wing.
Of course, this added quite a bit of weight to the aircraft, so other
components had to be beefed up as well, adding yet more weight.
In
the end, the Starship's max ramp weight rose by over 2,500 lbs to
15,010 lbs.
All of these trips back to the drawing board had another detrimental
effect;
Certification, production and customer delivery of the first airframes
kept
slipping, slipping, slipping, into the future.
The
original design was to be less than the FAA's 12,500 lb. limit for non
type
rated operation. But the redesigned Starship ended up requiring a type
rating
to fly, and many owner operators were intimidated by the prospect of
going
through the type rating process. Those pilots chose other aircraft such
as
Beech's venerable King Air instead, which could be flown with a simple
twin
engine rating.
The
higher weight of the Starship also reduced Beech's projected
performance claims
for the Starship. The Starship was supposed to have a max cruise speed
of 352
knots, a useful load of 4,599 lbs, stall at 79 knots and fly for over
2,500 nm
at max range power. But after the FAA was done beefing up the airframe,
those
numbers became 338 knots, 4,710 lbs, 89 knots and 1,575 nm
respectively. But
even with the extra weight and reduced performance, the Starship still
outperformed the King Air B-200. This is an amazing thing, and speaks
volumes
for the strength of the Starship's original design.
How
many other aircraft designs could even fly after such a weight gain,
let alone
climb to 41,000 feet? All this while actually increasing the useful
load by 111
lbs. The Starship is a truly great aircraft, even with her extra heft.
Imagine
how fabulous the Starship would have been if the FAA had certificated
her
original design.
Powerplants
Two 895kW (1200shp) Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A67As, driving five
blade
constant speed McCauley propellers.
Performance
2000 - Max cruising speed 622km/h (335kt), economical cruising speed
546km/h
(295kt). Initial rate of climb 3225ft/min. Max range 2630km (1634nm).
2000A -
Max cruising speed 621km/h (335kt), economical cruising speed 570kt
(307kt).
Initial rate of climb 2748ft/min. Range with reserves 2920km (1576nm).
Weights
2000 - Empty equipped 4484kg (9887lb), max takeoff 6531kg (14,400lb).
2000A -
Empty equipped 4574kg (10,085lb), max takeoff 6758kg (14,900lb).
Dimensions
Wing span 16.60m (54ft 5in), length 14.05m (46ft 1in), height 3.94m
(12ft
11in). Wing area 26.1m2 (280.9sq ft).
Dimensions
Wing span 16.60m (54ft 5in), length 14.05m (46ft 1in), height 3.94m
(12ft
11in). Wing area 26.1m2 (280.9sq ft).
Capacity
Flightcrew of one or two pilots. Standard passenger layout for eight in
2000 or
six in 2000A
Jack Berry's N214JB
To return to the Weems are Peculiar
